Views of Other Faiths

P.R. Sarkar

The following are the important religions or faiths prevalent in the world at the present time: Buddhism, Shaḿkara [Darshana, or Philosophy], Pátaiṋjala [Darshana], [Kápila] Sáḿkhya, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Árya Samája and Marxism. These can be arranged into the following groups according to their similarities: (1) Buddhism and Shaḿkara Philosophy; (2) Pátaiṋjala Philosophy and [Kápila] Sáḿkhya; (3) the Semitic faiths comprising Judaism, Christianity and Islam; (4) Árya Samája; and (5) Marxism. The outstanding principles and beliefs of the faiths within each group can be discussed together, except for those of the Semitic faiths, which are not discussed.

Buddhism and Shaḿkara [Darshana]

Ástika [theistic] Indian philosophies unanimously believe that átman [unit consciousness] is a continuous flow of jiṋána [knowledge of consciousness]. This is called vinána in Pali. There is a continuous flow of jiṋána, or in other words jiṋána itself is a flow (praváha). Every object in the universe has its own flow and wave, or dynamic force. According to Hindu Yoga Darshana,⁽²⁾ Paramátman [the totality of all the unit consciousnesses] is an infinite flow of jiṋána.

Ekaḿ jiṋánaḿ nityamádyantashúnyaḿ
Nányat kiḿcit varttate vastusatyam;
Tayorabhedo’smin indriyopádhiná vae
Jiṋánasyáyaḿ bhásate nanyathaeva.

–Shiva Saḿhitá

[One eternal knowledge without beginning or end: there is no other supreme truth. And when the upádhi, or special power, of the indriyas, or organs, to receive or transmit inferential vibrations is suspended, and the external world and the internal world become fused into one, there remains only the knowledge of One Entity.]

Bhagaván [Lord] Buddha did not use the word átman, hence there was a difference of opinion among the bhikśus [Buddhist monks] after his death. Three conferences were held – at Vaishali, Puspapur and Patliputra – after his death to compile the Tripit́aka [three groups of Buddhist teachings], and as a result the Tripit́aka was compiled in the following three parts in Pali: (1) Vinaya, or the practical side; (2) Sutta, or the theoretical side; and (3) Abhidhamma, or the philosophical side. All these parts combined together were known as the Tripit́aka, and were called the Buddhist shástra [scripture].

Those bhikśus who patronized or supported the [strict] sannyása márga [path of renunciation] were not prepared to accept anything more than what was laid down in the Tripit́aka, and hence they were called Sthaviravádiis or Therávádiis⁽³⁾ [followers of the southern school of Buddhism]. Those who were influenced by Nyáya⁽⁴⁾ were called Mahásaḿghikas [followers of the northern school of Buddhism].

The word páli originated from pallii, which [in adjectival form] means dehátii, or "rural", "rustic" or "unsophisticated". As Bhagaván Buddha preached in the common language of village folk, Hindu pandits named his language bhákhá [colloquial language]. Pali was also known as Pátalii Bháśá [bháśá = "language"]. Common people could not follow Sanskrit, which was the language of the pandits only.

Later on the Mahásáḿghikas called themselves Maháyániis, and they called the Sthaviravádiis Hiinayániis. But the Hiinayániis called themselves Therávádiis. In India there was no state backing for Hiinayána except during the time of [the rulers] Kanishka, Habishka and Vasishka, and hence Hiinayána could not flourish. Maháyána had state backing, and naturally had a larger number of followers. The philosophy of the Hiinayániis could only be preached in Ceylon [Sri Lanka], Burma [Myanmar], Siam [Thailand], Java, Borneo, etc., whereas the philosophy of the Maháyániis was propagated in India, Siberia, Japan, Tibet, etc.

There are four kinds of philosophical doctrine [discussed later in this chapter] among the Maháyániis. The reason for this difference of opinion is átman and its object. Bhagaván Buddha used the word attá in Pali for átman. The word attá is also used in place of "self". The bhikśus could not understand the sense in which Bhagaván Buddha used the word attá.

Charvaka: At the time of Buddha, nástika mata [the school of atheism] was predominant. Maharshi Ajita Keshakambali was the predominant pandit of the nástikas [atheists]. Most of the books of nástika mata were written in incomprehensible language, and so its propagation was not very widespread. Ajita Keshakambali believed in Charvaka, who propounded a materialistic philosophy. Buddhist philosophy is not a materialistic philosophy. The Charvaka school of philosophy believes in caturbhúta [four fundamental factors] only. This is also known as dehátmaváda [the doctrine that the body is everything]. This philosophy accepts caturbhúta, namely, earth, water, fire and air, that is, kśiti, apa, teja and marut [respectively]. According to Charvaka, caetanya [consciousness] came into existence by the combination of the four bhútas [fundamental factors], just as mixing lime and catechu produces a red colour. According to Charvaka, paiṋcama bhúta [the fifth fundamental factor] is formed like this and does not actually exist. Charvaka Philosophy does not believe in átman, Paramátman or the Vedas. Hence Charvaka was termed nástika, because those who do not believe in átman, Paramátman or the Vedas are called nástikas.

Púrva Miimáḿsá: Púrva Miimáḿsá [Early Miimáḿsá philosophy] does not accept the existence of Paramátman. Maharshi Kapil, the propounder of [Kápila] Sáḿkhya philosophy, accepted átman and the Vedas, but he did not believe in Paramátman. The Śad́adarshana [six major schools of theist Indian philosophy] believes in the Vedas.

The following constitute the Śad́adarshana:

1. Kápila Sáḿkhya, which accepts the existence of puruśa [consciousness], Prakrti [Supreme Operative Principle] and the Vedas, but does not accept the existence of Paramátman.

2. Pátaiṋjala Philosophy. Pátaiṋjala and Sáḿkhya believe in innumerable puruśas [unit souls] and Prakrti.⁽⁵⁾ The creator of the universe, according to these schools, cannot be a Mukta Puruśa.⁽⁶⁾

3. Gaotama Nyáya.

4. Kańáda Nyáya (Vaesheśika).

5. Jaemini’s Púrva Miimáḿsá, which believes in kriyá káńd́a [Vedic rituals]. Those who believe in this school accept the existence of heaven and hell.

6. Uttara Miimáḿsá [Later Miimáḿsá philosophy] of Vádaráyana Vyása, which believes in Brahma [the Supreme Entity] and the Vedas but does not believe in átman and jagat [the physical world]. This philosophy is commonly called Vedánta Darshana.

Baoddha [Buddhist] Darshana believes in all the five bhútas [caturbhúta plus ethereal factor], while Charvaka believes in caturtattva [the theory of four fundamental factors]. Buddhism and Charvaka do not come within the purview of Śad́adarshana, and neither of them believes in the Vedas.

Pramáńa [validation] is of three kinds, that is, pratyakśa [direct perception], anumána [inference] and ágama [authority]. Charvaka only accepts pratyakśa as pramáńa.

Pratyakśaeka pramáńaváditayá
Anumánáe anaḿgiikáreńa prámáńyábhávát.

[Direct perception is the only valid proof of knowledge. As inference and authority are denied as valid proofs of knowledge, there is no other proof of knowledge.]

Buddhism accepts karmaphala [the reactions of action], whereas Charvaka does not.

Yávajiivet sukhaḿ jiivet, násti mrtyuragocarah.

[As long as you live, you should live happily, because there is nothing after death.]

* * *

Yávajiivet sukhaḿ jiivet, rńaḿ krtyá ghrtaḿ pivet.

[As long as you live, you should live happily. Even if you have to go into debt, you should eat butter.]

* * *

Na svargo nápavargo vá naevátmá páralaokikam;
Bhasmiibhútasya dehasya punarágamanaḿ kutah.

[There is neither heaven nor a transitory stage between death and rebirth; there is neither soul nor any kind of afterlife. Once the body is burned to ashes, how can it come back again?]

There is still another aspect of Charvaka Philosophy, that is, dehaparińámaváda [the doctrine of physical transformation].

Caturbhyo khalu bhútebhyo caetanyamupajáyate;
Kińvádibhyah sametebhyah dravyebhyo madashaktivat.

[Consciousness arises from action and interaction among the four fundamental factors of matter, just as red colour comes from betel leaves, lime and catechu when they are chewed together.]

In this respect Buddhist philosophy is better than Charvaka. Bhagaván Buddha said, Attá hi attánam náthah ["Attá is the master of all other souls"].

Buddhism: Why did India accept Buddhism? There are various reasons for this, but the main ones are the following: First, the [Vedic] pandits never preached philosophy to the common people. They hated their language and called it bhákhá. Secondly, at that time there was no eminent philosopher, or tattvadarshii. Thirdly, the people in general were not ready to accept the pandits. Fourthly, the ácáryas [spiritual teachers] of that age, Shrii Saiṋjaya and Shrii Gaya Kashyapa, could not convince Bhagaván Buddha [of their philosophical beliefs]. All these factors led to the widespread propagation and acceptance of Buddhism.

Buddhism believes in rebirth and transmigration of souls, so the question arises, who is reborn if there is no átman? This question became a point of controversy among the bhikśus, and later among the Maháyánii pandits.

Buddhism believes in karmaphala. If karmaphala is accepted, the question arises, who performs karma [action] and who gets the karmaphala? Therefore the existence of átman has got to be accepted.

Towards the end of Buddha’s life, some of his disciples asked him about the existence of God. They asked two questions: "Does God exist?" and "Is it a fact that God does not exist?" In reply to both questions Buddha remained silent. As Buddha remained silent to both the questions, some of his disciples interpreted this to mean that there is no God. Another section of his disciples understood that God exists. Yet a third section came forward with the interpretation that there is God, but God is beyond the expression of asti ["is"] and násti ["is not"]; that is, God’s existence is inexplicable. Actually, God is supramental.

Yato váco nivarttante aprápya manasá saha;
Ánandaḿ Brahmańo vidván má vibheti kutashcana.

[Brahma is the One from whom words and mind return disappointed, after failing to fathom Its depths. But one who has known the blissful nature of Brahma is not afraid of anything.]

There are four sections in Buddhist Máyáváda [the Buddhist doctrine of illusion]: 1) pratyakśa váhya vastuváda [the doctrine of direct perception of external matter], or saotántrika darshana; 2) ánumeya váhya vastuváda [the doctrine of inferred perception of external matter], or vaebháśika darshana; 3) sarva shúnyaváda [the doctrine of nihilism], or mádhyamika darshana; and 4) kśańika vijiṋánaváda [the doctrine of transience], or Baoddha yogácára.

Pratyakśa váhya vastuváda accepts the universe as infinite, that is, anádi [beginningless] and ananta [endless]. When caetanya becomes álayiibhúta [objectivated], then it becomes jiṋána. (That which has the qualification of becoming an object is called álaya.) The outward world is transitory, but, due to rapid movement (saiṋcara or pratisaiṋcara), it appears to exist constantly. (According to Hindu philosophy, saiṋcara means "to go away from Brahma" and pratisaiṋcara means "to come near to Brahma"; that is, saiṋcara means the vikarśańii shakti [centrifugal force] of Brahma and pratisaiṋcara means the ákarśańii shakti [centripetal force] of Brahma.)

Ánumeya váhya vastuváda accepts that the waves of jiṋána are a permanent entity (sattá). There is the external world, but it will never be realized. When the waves of consciousness (jiṋána) come, the mind takes a form according to the saḿskáras [reactive momenta] of the citta [mind-stuff]. The formations created in the mind are taken to be satya [reality]. When jiṋána comes in contact with álambana,⁽⁷⁾ citta takes a formation. They take the outward álambana as the material realized.

Sarva shúnyaváda is also called mádhyamika darshana. It was propounded by Shrii Nágáruiṋja. He did not accept the páiṋcabhaotika world [the world of the five fundamental factors]. The external world which we see is Máyá.⁽⁸⁾ This philosophy is similar to Shankaracharya’s philosophy: Brahma satyaḿ jaganmithyá ["Brahma is the only truth; the world is an illusion"]. According to Shankaracharya, the universe has been created out of nothing, and it is like a dream and nothing more. Bháva [something] has been created out of abháva [nothing]. This school of philosophy accepts only the present and ignores the past and the future. It also says that the universe will merge into nothing.

Kśańika vijiṋánaváda does not accept the existence of the physical world. Here everything is internal. Even álambana is internal. Whatever is seen in this physical world is pratikriyá [the outer projection] of the internal álambana. Átman is the collection of the "I" feelings. It is not a continuous flow but appears to be so on account of the quick succession of its creation and destruction.

During the age of Bhagaván Shankaracharya, there was no outstanding philosopher (tattvadraśt́á) among the Buddhists. Among different sections of the Buddhists’ schools of philosophy, a serious dispute was going on. At that time Shrii Mańd́ana Mishra was the only pandit who believed in sarva shúnyaváda and was also a kriyá káńd́ii [follower of Vedic rituals]. He had to debate with Shankaracharya and was defeated.

According to Buddhist philosophy, there are four noble truths (satya) which are called caturárya satyam (caturájja saccam [in Pali]). They are as follows: 1) duhkha [suffering]; 2) kárańa of duhkha [the cause of suffering]; 3) nivrtti of duhkha [the cessation of suffering]; and 4) upáya of duhkha nivrtti [the path leading to the cessation of suffering].

The vikrti [distortion] of duhkhaváda [literally, "the doctrine of pessimism", i.e., the four noble truths] became atisukhaváda [the doctrine of ultra-hedonism]. Atisukhaváda was prevalent in Bengal, Assam and Tibet.

[According to Buddhism,] duhkha is árya satya [the absolute truth]. This is a wrong interpretation as it is the mánas [mind] only which experiences duhkha. Thus duhkha can only be a relative truth; it cannot be the absolute truth (árya satya).

Shaḿkara [Darshana]: Shankaracharya was a Shaeva Tántrika [practioner of Tantra who followed Shiva], and that is why he did not go against tantraváda⁽⁹⁾ [the doctrine of Tantra]. He believed in Nirguńa Brahma [the Non-Qualified Supreme Entity] only. To some extent his ideas fall in line with the theories of Baoddha [Buddhist] shúnyaváda. He did not believe in the existence of jagat, or the physical world. He accepted guńánvita Máyáváda [the doctrine of qualified illusion]. Due to his influence Buddhist Tantra disappeared, but in Hindu Tantra [some Buddhist] gods and goddesses still remained. Even today the goddesses of Buddhist Tantra, such as Tárá [a Chinese goddess], Manasá (the goddess of snakes), Shiitalá [the goddess of smallpox], Báráhii [the goddess of wild boars], etc., are being worshipped by the common people out of fear.

The shúnyavádiis had a great influence during the time Shankaracharya was preaching. Shankaracharya accepted Uttara Miimáḿsá as propounded by Shrii Vádaráyana Vyása.

Shrii Shankaracharya discussed the following subjects with Buddhist philosophers: The shúnyavádiis said that the universe came out of nothing and will go into nothing, everything being a dream. This was questioned by Shankaracharya, who said that even if the universe is nothing or a dreamland, there should be someone who witnessed the dream. The shúnyavádiis replied that there was no dreamer. The universe is an illusion (bhrama), just as a rope mistaken for a snake is an illusion. Shankaracharya said that this could not be possible. The shúnyavádiis said that this could only be understood through sadhana, while Shankaracharya said that it was not possible to have a dream without a dreamer. If the universe is an illusion like mistaking a rope for a snake, there had to be something like a rope which could be mistaken for the universe. Without a rope it would not be possible to mistake it for a snake. Besides this, there must be a person to make the mistake; similarly, there must be someone to have the illusion of the universe. This means that there must be some other entity to realize it.

The mádhyamikas [shúnyavádiis] said that nothing does not actually mean nothing (shúnya) – what you call Brahma, we call nothing – so the illusion of the universe is Brahma.

Yathá shúnyavádinám shúnyam;
Brahma Brahmavidáḿstathá.

[As shúnya is to the shúnyavádiis, so Brahma is to the Brahmavádiis.]

To this Shankaracharya replied that it means that both the one who sees and the object which is seen are an illusion; and where there is no one to see, who will mistake a rope for a snake? The shúnyavádiis could not answer.

The kśańikavádiis’ answer to Shankaracharya’s question was that the illusion is always kśańika [transient]. Shankaracharya’s question on this was that, according to him, Brahma was anádi and ananta but that the kśańika entity comes in a moment and disappears the very next moment, so where does the kśańika entity come from? Something must certainly exist between the span of creation and that of destruction. The kśańikavádiis replied that it is destroyed with the creation. Shankaracharya replied that this shows that there is no existence. The kśańikas felt defeated, but they still replied that the existence was negligible. This was not a satisfactory explanation.

The pandits of pratyakśa váhya vastuváda and ánumeya váhya vastuváda also argued for their philosophies, but no one could withstand the questioning of Shankaracharya, hence all four sections of Buddhism were defeated by Shankaracharya. After their defeat they made friends with Shankaracharya and accepted kulakuńd́alinii tattva [the concept of raising the latent spiritual potentialities in human beings], and as a result [transformed] Baoddha yogácára [kśańika vijiṋánaváda] came into existence.

There are several defects in Shankaracharya’s philosophy. According to Shankaracharya the universe is based on a fixed object influenced by Máyá; the fixed object is called Brahma. There is an illusion in mistaking a rope for a snake. Now the question arises, who has the illusion of [i.e., mistakes a rope for] a snake? One who already knows about snakes. If there is an illusion of Brahma for the universe, it means that the real universe is somewhere else. Thus the theory Brahma satyaḿ jaganmithyá is defective. This is a wrong interpretation given by Shankaracharya. Buddhists did not question it and hence it was accepted at the time.

Shankaracharya does not believe in jiivas [living beings] and jagat. Then the question arises, for what [or whom] does the illusion exist?

Aśt́akulácalasaptasamudráh Brahmapurandaradinakararudráh;
Na tvaḿ náhaḿ náyaḿ lokah vyarthaḿ kimarpi kriyate shokah.

[The eight great continents, the seven vast oceans, Brahmá (the Creator of the universe), Indra (the lord of energy), Súrya (the sun-god), and Rudra (the god of death): all these are unreal. Nothing exists, neither you nor I. So why do you vainly consider anything to be your own and increase the bondage of your attachment?]

The universe has not been created and hence there is no Saguńa Brahma [Qualified Supreme Entity]. Shankaracharya believes only in Nirguńa Brahma. Shankaracharya says that the universe is like a dream and the dreamer is also Brahma, as he did not believe in jiivas. When Brahma is nirguńa [non-qualified] how can He see, as seeing is also a quality. This was forgotten by Shankaracharya.

Again, according to Shankaracharya, everything that is seen and experienced is due to the influence of Máyá. This means Máyá is also an entity, which advaetaváda [monism, or non-dualism, a key theory of Shaḿkara Darshana] cannot accept.

Shankaracharya believes in the necessity of sadhana, but who will carry out the sadhana when the existence of jiivas is not accepted?

When Brahma is anádi and ananta, why should Brahma be influenced by Máyá? When the universe is created by the influence of Máyá, how is it that Brahma remains nirguńa? Máyá is a greater force than Brahma as Máyá influences Brahma.

Again, Shankaracharya says that there is no such thing as Máyá exactly, rather Máyá Itself is an illusion. A person in the desert sees water, houses, trees, etc., from a distance, but actually there is nothing. In the absence of jiṋána, the person experiences an illusion. When there is vikára [transformation] in Brahma, how can the universe be an illusion?

Shankaracharya says that where there is Brahma there is Máyá. Then the question arises, is Máyá nothing? If there is no Máyá, how can It influence [Brahma]? To overcome this Shankaracharya says that Máyá is not even nothing, It is inexplicable (anirvacaniiya). Again the question arises, who created Máyá if Brahma did not create It? Then Máyá becomes Saguńa Brahma.

Shankaracharya was able to defeat Buddhist philosophers only by a display of words. The Máyá of Shankaracharya is not the Prakrti of Ananda Marga.

One of the greatest critics of Shankaracharya’s philosophy was Jayanta Bhatta, the author of Nyáya Maiṋjarii.

Pátaiṋjala [Sáḿkhya] and [Kápila] Sáḿkhya

1. Both believe in the existence of many puruśas.

2. Both believe that the universe is created by Prakrti for the satisfaction of these puruśas. This is not logical because no bhoga, or satisfaction, is possible without the existence of mind. Puruśas do not have mind and they cannot be satisfied by the creation of the universe by Prakrti.

3. Both believe that Prakrti is not within Puruśa but is a separate entity. This is also illogical since Prakrti is only energy, or the shakti of Puruśa, and like the dáhika shakti [burning capacity] of agni [fire], Prakrti cannot be a separate entity. These philosophies are called dvaetaváda [dualistic] because they believe in two separate entities: Puruśa and Prakrti.

4. In [Kápila] Sáḿkhya there is no God, hence it is called niriishvaraváda [the doctrine of atheism], while Pátaiṋjala [Sáḿkhya] believes in God but does not believe in Brahma, therefore it is called seshvaraváda [the doctrine of theism].

5. Idol worship is supported by both these philosophies.

Árya Samája

1. It believes that jiivas, jagat and Brahma are all anádi. This only shows that jiivas and jagat, like Brahma, do not need any further progress, all the three being anádi alike. This is unacceptable because it leaves no necessity for sadhana which is the dharma of every jiiva. Also, it does not explain the reason for action and progress in the universe.

2. It believes in yajiṋas [ritual sacrifices] not as karma, but as a form of worship. Yajiṋa means karma, but in Árya Samája it means offering to Agni in a particular form. There is no rational meaning in performing such yajiṋas.

3. It also believes in pralaya [the annihilation of the world], which is irrational, since jiivas and jagat are anádi, and as such there is no place for pralaya.

Marxism

1. It believes in an equality among human beings which is only theoretical and not possible in practice because no two individuals are alike, hence they cannot be equal.

2. This faith finds its field of activity in the exploitation of poverty, hence it can only thrive in poverty-stricken areas.

3. It has no tolerance for other religions or organizations.

4. Its goal is purely imaginary equality.

5. This faith exists on violence only.

1957, Jamalpur